For the past twenty years, Saudi Arabia, which possesses significant oil reserves, has pursued nuclear capabilities. However, a recent deal with the United States aimed at solidifying this ambition has raised alarms that it, along with the chaotic consequences of the conflict between the U.S. and Iran, might lead to a renewed arms race in the region.
The most contentious aspect of the agreement reportedly allows Saudi Arabia the potential to enrich uranium domestically with diminished oversight from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), eliciting strong responses from commentators in Iran, Israel, and the U.S.
In Tehran, where a U.S.-led military operation was launched in February aimed at dismantling Iran’s nuclear ambitions, some officials have expressed a welcoming stance towards a potential arms race, questioning why Saudi Arabia should have nuclear capabilities if Iran cannot.
“If an arms race were to emerge in this area, we would undoubtedly have more latitude than anyone else,” stated Ali Zeinivand, spokesperson for Iran’s Interior Ministry, to reporters on Wednesday, as reported by state-affiliated media. “The U.S. has a history of bias; it permits some nations to have nuclear programs while denying others that right.”
An Iranian hardline publication, Hamshahri, criticized Washington for its “double standards” and accused Riyadh of being complicit in the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States.
“While targeting Iran’s legitimate nuclear ambitions and engaging in a full-scale conflict in the region, it is now granting a fundamentalist Islamic nation, implicated in the September 11 attacks, the authority to enrich nuclear weapons, posing a risk of nuclear proliferation,” the publication claimed.
Although 15 of the 19 hijackers on 9/11 were Saudi nationals, the Kingdom has consistently denied any involvement by its government in the attacks. The United States has long maintained that its ally had no part in the incidents, asserting that al-Qaeda acted independently in commandeering four commercial flights that struck the Twin Towers in New York City and the Pentagon.
Normalization with Israel
In Israel, where the Biden administration previously linked normalization with Saudi Arabia to the approval of the nuclear agreement, two Israeli officials indicated that Netanyahu was not surprised by the recent development.
“We anticipated this. It has been in the works for some time, and now (President) Trump is advancing it further,” one Israeli official shared.
Both officials noted that Israel does not perceive the deal as finalized and hopes to exert influence over the proceedings, whether through direct engagement with the White House or via the U.S. Congress.
The second Israeli official mentioned that Netanyahu aims to persuade Trump to incorporate advancements regarding Riyadh’s normalization with Israel into the overall agreement.
Trump stated on Thursday that the “Civil Nuclear Deal” with Saudi Arabia is “completely contingent” upon “Saudi Arabia joining the highly respected and successful Abraham Accords,” referencing the 2020 agreement that established diplomatic relations between Israel and several Arab nations, including Saudi neighbors like the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain.
Following the escalation of the Israeli conflict in Gaza after Hamas attacks on Israel in 2023, Saudi Arabia has insisted that it will not normalize relations until Israel agrees to a plan for Palestinian statehood and stability in Gaza.
The most dangerous component of the deal
An Israeli official expressed specific concern over Saudi uranium enrichment, labeling it “the most perilous element” of the agreement.
“Israel’s primary worry is not the civilian nuclear energy agreement itself but rather the uranium enrichment aspect,” remarked Yoel Guzansky, a senior researcher at INSS and a former official at the Israeli National Security Council, in a conversation with USdaily. “This could establish a hazardous precedent in the region.”
A nuclear agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the U.S., signed in 2009, is regarded as a “gold standard” under which Abu Dhabi consented to international oversight, prohibiting uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing—elements that alleviated proliferation concerns.
However, a provision in that agreement indicated that if “better terms were negotiated with another non-nuclear state in the Middle East,” Abu Dhabi could revisit and modify its agreement with Washington.
“Initially, this will undermine the Emirati model, which was predicated on renouncing the right to enrich,” Guzansky explained. “Their agreement has a clause that permits renegotiation if another nation secures a more favorable agreement, and they may seek to revisit it as well. Countries like Turkey and Egypt will be closely monitoring this situation. It also weakens the rationale against Iran.”
Nuclear arms race
The specter of nuclear ambiguity looms large in the region. Israel is thought to possess a secret nuclear program along with atomic weapons, while Iran has enriched uranium to levels close to weapons-grade and has long been suspected of preparing for weaponization, despite being a signatory to the UN’s Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Additionally, Iran’s former Supreme Leader issued a religious edict banning nuclear weapons.
Turkey and Egypt have collaborated with Russia to develop peaceful nuclear initiatives, and unlike Israel, they are signatories to the NPT. Turkey has also granted the UN access to additional information and nuclear sites.
In February, Turkey’s Foreign Minister cautioned that if Iran were to obtain a nuclear weapon, Ankara “may inevitably feel compelled to enter the same race.”
The agreement with Saudi Arabia is a cooperative nuclear framework, commonly referred to as a “123 agreement,” that includes a bilateral safeguards arrangement, according to the U.S. Department of Energy. U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright stated that the terms “maintain the highest standards of nuclear safety and nonproliferation.”
Before Saudi Arabia can begin uranium enrichment, a collaborative U.S.-Saudi team must assess whether the process is justified and commercially feasible. Any facility would be constructed by the U.S. without transferring sensitive technology, implying that these decisions will likely be deferred to future administrations. The agreement also prohibits Riyadh from developing or acquiring its own enrichment technology or purchasing it from other nations for a decade, as reported by the Wall Street Journal, which was the first to disclose the deal’s approval.
MBS’s pledge
As the conflict between the U.S. and Iran extends into its fifth month, with no active negotiations regarding Iran’s nuclear program, worries are mounting that Tehran may see a nuclear weapon as its only credible deterrent against future attacks, particularly as it retains nearly half a ton of highly enriched uranium.
A shift towards weaponizing the Islamic Republic’s nuclear fuel could trigger a regional chain reaction and fulfills longstanding warnings that an Iranian bomb would prompt Saudi Arabia to pursue its own nuclear weapons capabilities.
“Saudi Arabia does not desire to possess a nuclear bomb, but undoubtedly, if Iran were to develop one, we would follow suit at the earliest opportunity,” Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman remarked during a televised interview in 2018.
A year after the Saudi Crown Prince’s statements, the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed by the U.S. and Israel in late February, asserted that Washington had no issues facilitating nuclear facilities in Saudi Arabia due to the kingdom’s reliance on the U.S.
“I personally will not be troubled if they establish (nuclear facilities),” the deceased leader remarked to his followers during a speech at that time. “For I believe that, God willing, these will eventually fall into the hands of the Islamic Mujahideen in the not-so-distant future.”
